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The Paradox of Emancipation:  
Populism, Democracy, and the Soul of the Left 
 
“There are three kinds of despots. There is the despot who tyrannises over 
the body. There is the despot who tyrannises over the soul. There is the 
despot who tyrannises over the soul and body alike. The first is called the 
Prince. The second is called the Pope. The third is called the People.” 
 Oscar Wilde, “The Soul of Man under Socialism” (1891) 
 
 
1/ The Great Recession and the Downfall of the Left  
“We are neither right nor left, we are coming from the bottom and going for the top” 
– thus the Spanish Indignados1 phrased, in the summer of 2011, the anti-establishment 
upheaval that erupted in many western democracies amidst the latest economic crisis.  
That anger was directed at the ruling elites who had fallen guilty twice: first for 
creating the conditions for the 2008 financial meltdown, and then again for turning 
the financial crisis into a social one. For the past thirty years, they had administered 
on society a policy formula of unbridled capitalism:  a concoction of financial 
deregulation, internationally open markets and domestically free economies. This 
produced a vertiginous accumulation of risks which eventually imploded into a 
financial fiasco. Incumbents responded to this with the infamous ‘austerity policy -- a 
mix of raising taxes and downsizing public spending for the sake of appeasing 
financial markets, which incurred a severe social and human cost. Industrial 
production plunged, unemployment rose, consumer spending plummeted and 
essential public services vanished.  In the course of the decade that followed the 
financial collapse – a decade that came to be known as the Great Recession - the 
unemployment rate in some European regions rose to nearly 20 percent while the 
jobless youth rate became almost twice as high. The current recovery still feels to 
                                                     
1 ‘The Indignant’ were a protest movement mostly of young Spaniards who mobilized in the spring and 
summer of 2011 to protest high unemployment rates, welfare cuts and political corruption. Various 
sources report between 6.5 and 8 million participants. 
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many like an economic depression. These were textbook conditions for the revival of 
socialism as a political project, for the rise and rise of the Left. 
Yet, with a few exceptions, Left parties have not managed to harness the anti-
establishment energies and channel them into leftist politics. Democratic elections in 
the ‘free world’ continue to fuel the far right and even propel it to power, as it 
happened in Italy, Austria, the United States and Brazil. The majority of the vote 
keeps going to the center-right, which is the biggest political family in Europe and is 
likely to remain so after the May 2019 elections.2  More surprisingly still, this is 
happening not despite, but through the vote of those very groups that have historically 
supplied the core electoral basis of the Left – the overworked and underpaid working 
classes. How can we explain the downfall of the Left in conditions that should be 
lifting it to power? What is the connection between the surge of populism and the 
deflation of electoral support for traditional left-leaning ideological positions?  
The Left’s current predicament has of course much to do with the far right’s 
aptitude for responding to valid grievances about threatened livelihoods with the 
facile shortcuts of xenophobia – the easy efficiency of the ‘politics of fear’ 
(Azmanova 2004, 2011; Wodak 2015). Yet the political impotency of both the center-
Left and radical Left cannot be blamed entirely on the Right’s insolence and guile. 
Could there be something in the very nature of the Left’s response that underlies the 
continuous attrition of electoral support? Uncharacteristically blunt, Jürgen Habermas 
has recently charged: “The reason for the decline of social democratic parties is their 
lack of profile. Nobody knows any longer what they’re needed for.” (Habermas 
2018). Indeed, let us ask just that: What is the Left needed for? 
                                                     
2 At the 2009 and 2014 elections for the European Parliament, the center-right remained by 
far the biggest political family (comprising the economically liberal and culturally 
conservative European People’s Party, the economically and culturally liberal (neoliberal) 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe and the traditionalist European Conservatives 
and Reformists). The far-right (Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, and Europe of 
Nations of Freedoms) more than doubled its numbers, while support for the Left (the center-
left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, the radical left European United Left-
Nordic Greens, and the Greens-European Free Alliance) remained largely unchanged. 
Surveys in the run-up to the May 2019 elections indicate a decline in electoral support for the 
Left and forecast the center-right to remain the biggest group in the European Union 
legislature. Tellingly, support is rising only for the two far-right political groups as well as for 
the free market ALDE (https://europeelects.eu/ep2019/).  
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In what follows, I will inspect the Left’s attempts to respond to the rise of 
populism, in order to account for its persisting weakness in appealing to voters despite 
the renewed mobilization of leftist parties and movements.  I conceptualize this 
weakness in terms of a phenomenon Friedrich Nietzsche called ‘democratic 
prejudice’ – the reflex of reading history as the advent of democracy and its crisis. 
The Left currently views the damage done by neoliberalism in terms of erosion of 
democracy, as growing inequality has effectively disenfranchised many. It therefore 
endeavours to recover democracy by resurrecting the ‘jobs, growth and redistribution’ 
policy set that had been a trademark of the ‘golden age’ of Social Democracy in the 
three post-war decades. This nostalgic mind-set, I will argue, is preventing the Left 
from making an accurate diagnosis of the nature of the grievances fuelling the anti-
establishment revolt and, respectively, from formulating an apposite political strategy. 
This, in turn, is leading the Left into another predicament I call the ‘paradox of 
emancipation’: while fighting for equality and inclusion as essential conditions for 
democratic citizenship, the Left is validating the social order within which equality 
and inclusion are being sought – that is, it endorses the dynamics of competitive 
production of profit that constitute capitalism as a social order.  These dynamics, 
however, have been the root cause of our societies’ plight under neoliberal capitalism 
– much more so than under previous historical forms of capitalism. Much as it is 
commendable that the Left is now trying to resurrect the familiar agenda of 
progressive politics for a fair distribution of life-chances, I will argue that it is failing 
to question the nature of the life-chances that are being distributed. It is this 
peculiarity of the current historical conjuncture, I will suggest, that should nourish the 
Left’s soul, inform its mind and shape its body politics– that is, enable it to overcome 
the nostalgia for the democratic capitalism of the last century and build a novel 
counter-hegemony against globally integrated capitalism.  
My critique of the ‘democratic prejudice’ of the Left does not aim to challenge 
the validity of democracy as a normative ideal. I question the potency of the 
commitment to democracy as political ideology in the current historical context – that 
is, its suitability as a framework for political mobilization against the harms incurred 
by neoliberal capitalism. This will allow me to adumbrate, in the last part of the 
analysis, a proposal for mounting a novel counter-hegemony by expanding the Left’s 
focus beyond its traditional concerns with inequality and exclusion, to address also 
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the injustice of widening social and economic insecurity – a harm whose reach 
surpasses the working poor. I will suggest that reformulating its agenda of social 
justice around issues of economic insecurity that span across the ‘class divide’ would 
allow the Left to mobilize a broad coalition of social forces for radical and lasting 
change. 
 
2/ A Democratic Renaissance  
How did the Left get to the state of political impotence from which it is now at pains 
to recover? The center Left and the radical Left had taken different roads to this point.  
For the center-Left, that was the path of partnering with the center-Right in crafting 
what Nancy Fraser (2017) has called a hegemonic ‘progressive neoliberalism’ – a 
consensus between the main political families on combining, on the one hand, free 
market capitalism and, on the other, the progressive agenda of the New Left for 
gender, sexual, racial and ethnic inclusion and equality, as well as environmental 
protection. In order to mainstream its agenda and secure a place for itself at the 
political wheel of national governments, part of the Left thus sold its socialist soul to 
capitalism, moving significantly to the right on economic and social policy. However, 
the combination of opening national economies to global trade and shrinking the 
social safety net domestically – a combination that characterized the political 
economy of progressive neoliberalism --eventually imperiled the livelihoods of the 
industrial working classes as many jobs moved abroad.  The complicity of the center-
Left in the neoliberal policy project thus alienated its typical supporters.  
The radical Left, while resisting the Faustian bargain the center-Left had 
made,  became afflicted by ‘left-wing melancholy’ – a term Walter Benjamin coined 
in 1931 to describe a particular state of mind of the anti-capitalist militant -- a state of 
grieving a dying ideal while altogether keeping a firm commitment to it (Benjamin, 
1974[1931]).3  Visions of communism and socialism had suffered a series of 
historical defeats: the absent proletarian revolutions in the West, the discrediting of 
these ideals by the dictatorships in Eastern Europe, and the eventual collapse rather 
than liberalization of these regimes in 1989-1990. These defeats instilled in left 
                                                     
3 For a discussion of the concept and its historical iterations see Brown (1999), Traverso (2017) and 
Gordon (2017).  
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intellectuals a sense of ardent but introverted anxiety, which gradually drained the 
radical Left of political agency. Since the project of socialism seemed to have entered 
a dead-end, activism was reduced to resistance and building resilience, at best. 
Together, the unbearable lightness of centrist  neoliberalism the endurable load of 
left-wing melancholia hampered the Left’s capacity to respond promptly to the rise of 
social discontent throughout the Great Recession.  
The recent eruption of populism, however, has broken the spell of the 
neoliberal hegemony; it has opened a new space for political conflict and creativity, 
for a renewed contest among political ideologies, and with that – the opportunity for 
the construction of a new political order (Azmanova 2018, Mouffe 2018). The revival 
of left politics is effectively taking place – most abruptly visible with the upsurge of 
democratic socialism in the US that began with the overwhelming support of young 
voters for Bernie Sanders at the presidential primaries in 2016. The Women’s March 
that took place on January 21st 2017 in protest against Donald Trump’s inauguration 
as U.S. President was reportedly the largest single-day political demonstration in U.S. 
history. It seemed to have awoken the Left from its solipsistic posture of passive 
mourning.     
Recently, at parliamentary elections in Europe, as well as at the October 2018 
mid-term elections in the United States, the Left has been eager to reconnect to its 
voters by castigating economic inequalities and advancing pragmatic proposals on 
broadly shared concerns: from affordable health care and keeping down the costs for 
prescription drugs and college tuition (the Democratic Party platform in the U.S) to 
building affordable housing and keeping children free from poverty (the SPD 
platform in Germany). Thus, the center-Left’s break with neoliberalism and the 
radical Left’s recovery from political melancholia are taking place as an effort to 
reclaim the achievements of the ‘golden age’ of democratic capitalism from before 
the onset of neoliberalism – the time of the Welfare State with its capital-labor class 
conflicts and reconciliations and its growth-and-redistribution accommodations.4   
                                                     
4 It is yet unclear whether the Green New Deal resolution which the left wing of the Democratic Party 
introduced to Congress on 7 February 2018 signals (1) a novel synergy between the social justice and 
the environmental justice agendas, which could effectively recruit broad support, (2) the subordination 
of the former to the latter, which might alienate the working classes, or (3) masking a radical socialist 
agenda as concerns for environmental emergencies, which is unlikely to secure the broad appeal it 
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Significantly, this incipient revival of the Left is taking place not within an 
explicit narrative of a return to the olden days of Social Democracy, even if the policy 
formulas are straight from that classical arsenal. The overarching narrative of political 
mobilization is now, instead, that of saving, recovering, or radicalizing democracy. 
While social justice issues typical for the Left had been taken out of the realm of 
political conflict under the neoliberal consensus, they are now re-emerging, and are 
politicized through the discourse of damages to democracy. The ‘catch-all’ imagery 
of democracy is to serve the strategic goal of maintaining a broad public appeal -- to 
show voters, as Democratic party leader Nancy Pelosi put it, that Democrats are “a 
governing party, not the leftist mob that Mr. Trump has described”.5  The nebulous, 
allegedly non-ideological, (and arrogant) expression ‘progressive politics’ has become 
the common term the Left uses in self-identification, replacing the explicit reference 
to anti-capitalism or socialism. I will continue using the term, even as I object to its 
hubris (as it implies that those who disagree with us are reactionary), because it has 
gained currency in contemporary political discourse, but I will subvert what we mean 
by ‘progress’.  
There are distinct gains from adopting democracy, rather than socialism, as a 
narrative in political mobilization. Democracy as a moral platform of equality and 
inclusion supplies the precious faith-like certitude of being on the right side of 
history: it is giving the Left back its soul. Moreover, the implementation of political 
democracy by establishing a truly universal franchise is a matter of real urgency in the 
United States, where Republicans, through gerrymandering and voter suppression, are 
preventing majority preferences from entering politics. The colonization of politics by 
big money in the United States, as well as to some extent in Europe, is the gravest 
barrier to the representation of the popular will, because the preferences of economic 
                                                     
seeks. The European Socialists are running on a similar platform at the May 2019 European Parliament 
elections, but surveys of the aggregative voting behavior (the “popular vote”) reveal that since the 
beginning of active electoral mobilization in October 2018, support for the center-right parties has 
increased, it has dropped for the center-Left, and has remained flat for the radical left (European 
election survey of 18 Feb.2019 at https://europeelects.eu/ep2019/) 
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actors who are bankrolling politics invariably trump the preferences of ordinary 
voters.6  
And yet, I will claim that the Left’s adoption of radical democracy as its 
overarching political ideology is not only unlikely to deliver the aspired prize of 
electoral victories, but it is also antithetical to the very goal the Left has set for itself – 
to significantly reduce social injustice.  
 
3/ Democracy as a rhetorical common place 
Let me begin elaborating this claim by addressing the most innocuous danger. The 
reformulation of left politics as the radicalization of democracy is ineffective because 
this claim is being made by a variety of political actors, while the term ‘democracy’ 
has been drained of its original affinity with anti-capitalism. 
 About a century ago, democracy was still a daring political project. While the 
term democracy had been almost absent from the language of the American and 
French revolutions of the eighteenth century, by the time the 1848 revolutions in 
Europe erupted, it had acquired a decidedly radical ring to it: democracy was believed 
to be “the certain and rapid prelude to ‘socialism’” (Hobsbawm 1975:15). However, 
Eric Hobsbawm reminds us, by the end of the nineteenth century the rulers of Europe 
and the Unites States had come to the conclusion that democracy was inevitable; that 
“it would probably be a nuisance but politically harmless” (ibid). Deprived of its 
radical connotation as a threat to capitalism, within another century the term 
‘democracy’ has become a catch-all phrase for more or less decent politics.  
What makes the term ‘democracy’ so pliable as a tool of political mobilization 
is that it is a rhetorical common-place, that is, a unit of broadly shared knowledge 
without fixed content.  Importantly, the notion has travelled quite a distance from its 
original connotation of a ‘mob rule’ to become a vague term with a strongly positive 
connotation. This renders it attractive to a wide range of political positions. Tellingly, 
                                                     
6
 According to the widely discussed study of Martin Gilens and Benjamin Page, “economic elites and 
organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on U.S. 
government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent 
influence” (Gilens and Page, 2014: 564). 
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one of the first political forces in modern history to adopt the label ‘democracy’ for 
itself was a conservative faction within the French National Assembly of 1789 – the 
Monarchiens who called themselves "Democratic Royalists".7 Nowadays, Europe of 
Freedom and Democracy is the name of one of the two Eurosceptic and xenophobic 
political groups in the European Parliament, which has as its members the likes of the 
Sweden Democrats –a party with roots in fascism. Right-wing formations from 
around the world congregate in the Centrist Democrat International and the 
International Democrat Union.  
Not long ago, the neoliberal theology of the Third Way aspired to overcome 
the limitations of the left and right political alternatives through the mantra of 
achieving prosperity for all via open and free markets. This theology is now being  
rapidly replaced by a cross-ideological veneration of democracy. The mainstream 
political families condemn populism as an assault on our cosmopolitan, pluralistic, 
multiracial democracy. They invoke the recent past of a purportedly well-functioning 
democracy and warn that Trump, his European counter-parts and their supporters will 
demolish that order and create a new one based on white racial authoritarianism and 
plain plutocracy. On the other side of the barricades, the likes of Hungarian premier 
Victor Orban are proudly adopting the label ‘illiberal democracy’.  While populist 
leaders used a discourse of fear when building up their movements and rising to 
power, they are currently using a discourse of democracy to consolidate their 
positions and stabilize their hold on power. They charge that democracy has been 
usurped by wealthy elites through the very institutions of representative government 
that are supposed to safeguard democracy. Anti-EU populists (but also many of us in 
academia) epict EU institutions as part of a self-serving, corrupt elite that ignores the 
will of the people and are vouching to cure the infamous ‘deficit of democracy’ by 
transferring more decisional power down to national parliaments.8 This is in line with 
                                                     
7
 The name Democratic Royalists aspired to capture the idea of combining the rights of royal authority 
with those of the common man. The official adoption of the label ‘democracy’ at the time was curious 
because the term was largely absent from the rhetoric of the French revolution. Between 1789 and 
1796, none of the numerous revolutionary newspapers and journals used “democracy” or “democratic” 
in their name (Rosanvallon 2009:541). 
8 See Chalmers et al. 2016. The European Left has been mobilizing for the 2019 European Elections 
behind the “Manifesto for the democratisation of Europe – so called “Piketty Plan” – which includes a 
Democratization Treaty for Europe. My solution to the problem favours enhancing political 
accountability and exercising pressure for altering the nature of policy (Azmanova 2013). I am 
skeptical that national parliaments would necessarily stand against neoliberal economic policy under 
pressures for keeping their national economies competitive in the globally integrated markets.   
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a long-standing neoliberal stratagem: neoliberal elites across the political spectrum 
have been vetting the policies through which they transferred social responsibility 
from the state to society with the discourse of strengthening local democracy. Thus, 
they have been usurping power through the supranational while shifting responsibility 
to the local. Optimists who count on the wisdom of national and local democracies to 
fight neoliberalism might do well to remember that the set of policies that launched 
global neoliberal capitalism were coined by two of the most mature national 
democracies (the U.S. under Ronald Raegan and the U.K. under Margaret Thatcher)  
Not only political leaders, but also public administrations and civil society 
actors themselves are eagerly running to the rescue of democracy. The City Hall in 
New York acquired a new Democracy NYC office in October 2018.9  ‘Democracy 
drinks’ are organized monthly by the Brussels’ Defenders of Democracy, a 
community of civil service professionals (from those very EU institutions charged 
with a ‘democracy deficit’), who organize events “to grow and support a larger 
community of democracy defenders and freedom loving people,” in their own 
words.10  
If democracy were just a rhetorical commonplace with a powerful normative 
charge that can be deployed in the pursuit of almost any political project, the Left 
might indeed be wise to take advantage of it. However, it is more than that. 
‘Democracy’, in the way the term is currently used, has the features of what Michael 
Tigar has described as political mythologies: “structures of words and images that 
portray people, institutions, and events in ways that mask an underlying reality” 
(Tigar 2018: l.60, italics added). If this is indeed the case – if the discourse of 
democracy is masking a reality of noxious power dynamics, the Left’s adoption of  
democracy as ideology would entail narrowing the horizon of critique and the 
ambitions of criticism. Let us examine this hypothesis.  
 
                                                     
 
9
 It is headed by a democracy officer (currently Ayirini Fonseca-Sabune) on a salary of $165,000-a-
year (reported in Neuman 2018).  
10
 Defending Democracy website -- https://defending-democracy.org/community/democracy-drinks/ 
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4/ The ‘Democratic Prejudice’ 
The growing number of self-appointed saviors of democracy might indeed be a reason 
for concern. Plato’s observation springs to mind that one could detect the poor health 
of a community by the number of its lawyers and medical doctors – the more of them 
there are, the sicker a society is (Plato, 1968 [380BC]: 84). The more democrats it 
begets, the sicker our democracy gets. This circularity is not frivolous. It has 
something to do with the relationship between democracy as a form of society and 
democracy as a political regime. It will be necessary to examine this relationship in 
order to discern the reality of power dynamics which democracy-as-ideology 
accommodates.  
  As currently used in the political rhetoric of the Left, democracy is endorsed 
both as the goal as well as the tool of obtaining that goal: the democratic society (one 
marked by inclusion as well as maximum equality and liberty for all -- or 
‘equaliberty’ in Etienne Balibar’s apt formulation) is to be obtained through the 
mechanisms of political democracy – that is, through the mechanisms of collective 
decision-making such as local councils, deliberative fora, and parliaments. 
Importantly, to the extent that political democracy is understood as effective equality 
of citizenship (rather than just as formal-legal equality), the economic, political, and 
cultural dimensions of democratic membership are all essential commitments in the 
mobilization of the Left. Social justice, obtained through wealth redistribution and job 
creation, is seen as a prerequisite for inclusive and equal (ergo, democratic) 
citizenship.  
The idea of socialism, however, implies an alternative understanding of 
democracy – it is a qualitatively different form of society, not just a matter of 
quantitatively equal distribution of power among all members (democratic 
citizenship). The idea of socialism, as Axel Honneth reminds us, was conceived as a 
project of subjecting economic activities to the greater social will; a socialist society 
secures not so much equality as it brings economic processes under the control of the 
broader society and to the service of it (Honneth, 2016:9-10). Karl Polanyi’s 
discussion of socialism is helpful in elucidating the understanding of democracy as a 
form of society in which social justice is more than a matter of equal distribution of 
power.  Polanyi defines social justice (one of the tenets of socialism) as meeting the 
11 
 
needs of the entire society.11 In his account, social priorities concern the distribution 
of labor and goods, but above all the direction of production in line with higher social 
use value, as opposed to individual consumer preferences (Polanyi, 2016[1922]: 388).  
Can democracy as a form of society, thus understood, be achieved with the 
mechanisms of democracy as a political system and as political ideology? Marx’s 
misgivings about the emancipatory potentials of liberal democracy are well known 
(the legal equality of citizens in capitalist societies masks their social inequalities and 
thus enables the oppression of labor by capital). To this we can object, with E.P. 
Thompson, that even as the content of bourgeois law is oppressive, the idea of the rule 
of law is emancipatory and therefore of service to humanity: “the rule of law itself, 
the imposing of effective inhibitions upon power and the defense of the citizen from 
power's all-intrusive claims [is] an unqualified human good” (Thompson 1975:266). 
It is the democratic nature of the rule of law, so to speak -- its general and equal 
application within the bounds of a political community, that ensures this 
emancipatory effect.   
When I speak of the perils of democracy as political ideology confined to 
equality of citizenship, I do not have in mind the Marxian critique of the bourgeois 
nature of political liberalism, but rather a phenomenon Friedrich Nietzsche called the 
“democratic prejudice of the moderns”. He observed that when we perceive the past 
through the egalitarian and progressive historiographical self-congratulatory conceits 
of the present, we fail to understand other schemes of values and we miss the chance 
to understand and reflect on ourselves through them (Nietzsche, 1967[1887]: 
28). Following Nietzsche, Wendy Brown warns that democratic prejudice makes us 
bad readers of the past and hampers our capacity to shed light on the workings of 
power (Brown, 2014: 110).12 Brown’s interpretation of the ‘democratic prejudice’ in 
terms of the constraints it imposes on the analysis of specific historical circumstances 
and the dynamics of power undergirding these circumstances is particularly germane 
                                                     
11
 The second tenet of socialism, in Polanyi’s account, is maximum productivity, defined as 
maximizing the number of goods at minimal labor effort (Polanyi 2016[1922]: 388). 
12
 I am indebted to Azar Dakwar for an insightful discussion on the origins and applications of the 
notion ‘democratic prejudice’. 
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to the current analysis. How does the democratic prejudice play put in the current 
historical conjunction?  
The Left’s renewed mobilization, we noted, now takes place within a tale of 
the advancement, crisis, and urgent revival of democracy. Modernity, as this tale 
goes, has developed as a culmination of democracy in the affluent and pluralistic 
Western societies after WWII, when the edifice of the Welfare State came to combine 
the universal electoral franchise with social and economic rights. The onset of 
neoliberalism in the late twentieth century eroded the felicitous model of democratic 
capitalism; the goal is, therefore, to heal democracy by resurrecting the policies of 
inclusion and equality that marked the heyday of the Welfare State. Thus, the political 
mobilization and ideological recovery of the Left is taking place on the terrain of 
democracy as historiography, as a normative horizon, and as a strategy for getting 
there. 
The democratic prejudice is now impairing the Left in two ways – I will 
proceed to discuss them as ‘Welfare State nostalgia’ and ‘Kantian moral optimism’. 
First, the noxious effects of neoliberalism are being posited against the achievements 
of the affluent and pluralistic post-WWII welfare state which is often portrayed as the 
golden age of American and European democracy, much of which is credited to the 
leadership of the Left (Social Democratic and Socialist parties in Europe and the 
Democrats in the United States). This self-congratulatory idealization of the 
achievements of the welfare state is making the Left oblivious to the negative features 
of that format of democratic capitalism -- from intensified consumerism to the 
privileging of labor-market insiders – features that have been subjected to poignant 
critique by left-leaning intellectuals.13 The material affluence and relative material 
equality that are currently the object of left nostalgia, came at the price of heavy 
bureaucratic control, waste of resources through economic mismanagement, as well 
as considerable damage to the natural environment that the dynamics of intensified 
production and consumption entailed. As Chantal Mouffe recently remarked, because 
many of the social-democratic achievements have been eroded during the neoliberal 
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 Within the Frankfurt School critique of late capitalism, the most notable works in this regard are 
Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man (1964) and Habermas’ Legitimation Crisis (1973). Michel 
Foucault’s criticism of the deeply oppressive nature of ‘neoliberalism’ in his The Birth of Biopolitics 
(1978/79) was directed at the model of post- WWII collectivist and state-managed capitalism that many 




hegemony, ‘we find ourselves in the paradoxical situation of having to defend various 
welfare state institutions that we criticized earlier for not being radical enough” 
(Mouffe 2018, l.455).  
The contrast now ‘progressive’ forces draw between, on the one hand, the 
democratic capitalism of the Welfare State and neoliberalism, on the other, is 
misleading. The cross-ideological policy consensus that enabled the Welfare State 
was activated by a policy mix of stimulating demand and consumption to spur job 
creation and production, and thus provide resources for wealth distribution. This 
productivist policy formula was not entirely eliminated by the neoliberal policy shift 
of the late twentieth century, it was sublimated by it. Let me explain. Neoliberalism 
inherited from the welfare state a policy formula prioritizing production and job 
creation, but added to it free trade – global market integration. This allowed jobs (and 
thus sources of livelihood) to leave the domestic economies and relocate abroad. This 
in no way changed the productivist nature of the political economy of western 
societies, while it hampered the life-chances of many workers, especially as the 
sources for redistribution thinned out with the possibility of companies relocating 
abroad in search of lower taxation. The neoliberal state also inherited the 
redistributive know-how of the welfare state, but deployed it differently – to 
redistribute resources from the losers to the winners of globalisation, thus aggregating 
the risks and opportunities to specific social groups, rather than spreading them 
equitably (Azmanova, 2014).14 In this sense, the contrast now drawn between 
neoliberalism and the golden days of democracy (under the mature Welfare state of 
the 1970s, when redistribution, recognition and representation achieved considerable 
equality and inclusion) is deceitful. It obscures an important continuum between the 
two phases of capitalism – a continuum based on a jobs-and-growth policy formula 
which is now forcing the Left make a hard choice between environmental justice and 
social justice.  
If the Welfare State nostalgia is the first way in which the ‘democratic 
prejudice’ is hampering the Left, the second way is the Kantian moral optimism that 
permeates the Left’s faith in the capacity of democracy as a political regime to give 
                                                     
14 Due to this peculiarity of the institutionalized allocation of life-chances, I have called the latest state 
of capitalism ‘aggregative capitalism’, timing the switch from neoliberal to aggregative capitalism with 
governments’ making the national competitiveness in the global economy a top policy priority, 
sometime in the very early 21st century (Azmanova 2014).  
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birth to democracy as a form of society. In his writings on moral philosophy, Kant 
argued that we can never establish with theoretical certainty that we have free will. 
Therefore, he held, it is up to us to endorse the faith that we are free: that we can be 
moved by moral reasons, assert our autonomy, and fulfill the demands of morality. At 
the same time, however, in his political writings, Kant advised that in matters 
political, we should not rely on assumptions about the moral properties of individuals 
(Kant 1903 [1795]:154-155).15  In violation of Kant’s cautioning, political activism on 
the Left is affected by Kantian moral optimism regarding politics, especially when it 
comes to democracy as a political system. A faith in the moral and cognitive 
capacities of citizens engaged in collective self-determination permeates 
contemporary democratic theory and the political mobilization of the Left. A 
procedurally perfect political democracy (one free from the direct impact of power 
and money, where power inequalities among citizens are erased) is entrusted to 
deliver a democratic society. If only we had a procedurally perfect democracy to 
translate the popular will, uninhibited, into politics!   
We can maintain this democratic optimism only by ignoring the insights of 
much of contemporary social and political theory.  We must ignore, for instance, the 
observations of neo-institutionalism and social constructivism regarding the nature of 
individual preferences – actors’ preferences, their perceptions of interest, are 
endogenous to the institutions and social practices through which people are 
socialized; all rationality is socially embedded rationality. Even as the complex and 
fragmented nature of the social totality (as being composed by diverse practices and 
processes of socialization) allows for individuals’ relative autonomy, one cannot 
safely assume that even the most perfect process of collective decision-making would 
be impervious to the prevalent dynamics of socialization. In other words, if we take 
the concept of praxis seriously —i.e. of a historically and socially situated human 
agency, we cannot but take into account that subjectivities are formed through 
socialization within a social order and therefore subjects are affected (and not just 
infected) by the constitutive dynamics of that social order.  
In this vein, if we understand capitalism as an institutionalized social order 
(and not simply a market economy), we must admit that the logic of capitalist 
                                                     
15
 Tellingly, ‘despotic democracy’ is one of the ideal types of political regimes in the taxonomy Kant 
elaborates in Perpetual Peace. He puts his trust in republicanism as a political formula that combines a 
democratic forms of sovereignty with liberal style of the exercise of power (see Azmanova 2013.  
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accumulation is not just an economic logic, but also a social one. As a social logic, it 
therefore permeates the subjects who are casting their political choices while enacting 
their collective sovereignty. The lifeworld these subjects inhabit is not simply 
colonized by the rationality of capitalist efficiency that drives the competitive 
production of profit. That logic supplies social actors with reasons valid from the 
point of view of those social subjectivities. (Of course, like Jürgen Habermas, we can 
reason otherwise and find a felicitous way out, but that would be to give in to the 
fallacy of Kantian moral optimism while betraying Kant’s political realism – 
discussed above).  
Representative, direct, and participative forms of capitalist democracy, even at 
their perfect maturity, are all enacted by individuals whose life-chances are dependent 
on their successful socialization within capitalism as a social order. This means that 
the institutional paraphernalia of democracy as a political regime alone is insufficient 
to obtain democracy as a form of emancipated society – that is, a society free of the 
productivist imperatives of the pursuit of profit. At best, political democracy can 
obtain equal and inclusive capitalism (indeed, this is what the populist insurrections 
demand) through policies of redistribution and recognition. Nevertheless, democratic 
capitalism will still be committed to the productivist dynamic of growth, as well as 
the competitive pursuit of profit that are so injurious to human beings, communities 
and nature. The tensions between democracy and capitalism have been a permanent 
source of emancipatory energies, but more often than not the imperative of 
competitive production of profit has dampened democracy’s most radical aspirations 
– those going beyond the quest for equality and inclusion within an affluent society.  
The Left should, therefore, revisit the question of the relationship between 
democracy as a political regime and democracy as a form of society in order not to 
over-burden political democracy with tasks it cannot deliver. Here Karl Polanyi and 
Rosa Luxembourg offer relevant insights.  
Rosa Luxembourg problematizes the relationship between political democracy 
and social progress in the following way. On the one hand, she is an unwavering 
adept of political democracy. Criticizing the nascent autocratic socialism after the 
October Revolution in Russia, Luxemburg urges: “Socialist democracy is not 
something which begins only in the promised land after the foundations of socialist 
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economy are created… [it] begins simultaneously with the beginnings of the 
destruction of class rule and of the construction of socialism” (Luxemburg, 1918). 
However, she mistrusted the mechanisms of electoral democracy, even with a fully 
expanded franchise, to do the work of radical social reform.16 It is worth reproducing 
her caustic depiction of the hopes and fears of giving electoral power to the working 
class in the run-up to the Weimar National Assembly of 1919-1920, because the 
sentiments which are the object of her sarcasm are also prevalent among the Left 
today:  
“[T]he various social classes will come together, engage in a pleasant, calm 
and ‘dignified’ discussion with each other, and will afterwards hold a vote, perhaps 
even one with a famous ‘division’. When the capitalist class sees that it is in the 
minority, it, as a well-disciplined parliamentary party, will declare with a sigh, 
There’s nothing we can do! We see that we are outvoted. All right, we shall submit 
and hand over all our lands, factories, mines, all our fire-proof safes and our 
handsome profits to the workers" (Luxemburg, 1972[1918]).  
The mechanisms of democratic representation, even when fully developed, 
can be a tool for democratizing the social order, but not for the radical transformation 
of the nature of that order. Karl Polanyi elucidates the internal limitations of political 
democracy in this regard. In discussing socialism as a form of society that prioritizes 
social needs over consumer satisfaction, he notes that meeting the needs of society 
incurs costs, which he refers to as ‘social costs’, alongside the technical costs of 
production (‘natural costs’).  He notes that capitalism cannot give priority to social 
justice or community aims because it is devoted to capital accumulation and driven by 
the profit motive: paying the social costs jeopardizes the profit motive. Only after the 
foundations of socialism as a form of society are established, Polanyi concludes, 
social priorities can be determined democratically by every member of society 
(Polanyi, 2016[1922]:388). Indeed, the most celebrated achievement of the Welfare 
State – the democratization of affluence, was achieved through institutionalized 
intensification of production and private consumption.   
                                                     
16 Like Marx, she considered electoral democracy to be an “outmoded legacy of bourgeois revolutions, 
an empty shell, a requisite from the time of petit-bourgeois illusions of a ‘united people’ and of the 
‘liberty, equality, fraternity’ of the bourgeois State" (Luxemburg, 1972[1918]). 
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Polanyi’s elaboration of social justice sheds light on the deficiency of the now 
prevalent agenda of the Left. In his account, social justice is not a matter of equal 
distribution of resources and social status among citizens, nor is it to be understood in 
quantitative, arithmetic terms of equalization of power relations. Social justice (and 
the truly democratic society) is to be understood qualitatively – as meeting the needs 
of the entire society (i.e. of access to education, clean environment, healthcare, 
leisure). It is in this sense that a socialist society is democratic in its very nature.  The 
equalization of power relations is not a means for achieving social justice, this 
equalization is an natural outcome of a democratic society in which social relations 
are constituted through practices serving the satisfaction of the long-term societal 
interests rather than the accumulation and distribution of wealth or satisfying the 
short-term consumer preferences of all citizens.  
In this sense ‘democratic capitalism’ is an oxymoron: the goals of a 
democratic society, that is, one committed to collective goals, are by definition 
incompatible with capitalism’s constitutive dynamic (and ergo, key interest) – the 
perpetuation of capital accumulation. A capitalist society can accommodate a 
democratic political system only to the extent that this political system does not 
challenge in any radical way capitalism’s constitutive dynamic. That is why 
democratic capitalism (as a socio-political order) cannot conceive of social justice as 
anything other than equality of wealth and decent working conditions in the 
generation of wealth. Within capitalism as a social order, social justice can therefore 
only be perceived in productivist terms -- as fairness in the production, redistribution, 
and consumption of wealth. It is little wonder that both the center-Right and the far 
Right have recently voiced calls for social rights and redistribution (as inequality 
threatens consumptions -- one of the engines of the economy). The creation of the 
European Pillar of Social Rights (as part of the European Union’s key policy 
commitments) in 2017 was an initiative of the center-right. None other than Christine 
Lagarde, IMF’s Managing Director and Chairwoman, has been urging global leaders 
to fight inequality through redistribution in order to stabilize the economy and quell 
populism (Lagarde 2017). The Right is reviving its pre-neoliberal, productivist, 
worker-ist (ouvrierist) mantra of alleviating the burden on businesses for the sake of 
job creation. Thus, in a recent treatise on making America great again through the 
renewal of work, Oren Cass, one of the ideologists of the Republican Party, spouts the 
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ideas of employer-worker partnerships in creating “a labor market in which workers 
can create and support strong families and communities”, in Mitt Romney’s praise on 
the book jacket (Cass 2018).17 
 While erecting the edifice of the Welfare State in the course of the twentieth 
century, the Left gradually came to abandon the original qualitative notion of a 
democratic society (socialism) and adopt a quantitative understanding of democracy – 
as equality of citizenship within a capitalist society. This version of democracy is not 
only perfectly compatible with the dynamics of competitive profit production but is 
dependent on it – we need to grow the pie in order to distribute it – with all the 
attendant dynamics of exploitation, alienation, and destruction of nature.  
The quantitative vision of democracy is well obtainable with the mechanisms 
of political democracy – that is, as long as we assume that the majority’s preferences 
would support the equalization of power relations, which is far from certain. As the 
authors of the ‘oligarchy’ study I discussed earlier remark, were the U.S. electoral 
system to translate the views of average Americans correctly into policy, that policy 
would be much less liberal and inclusive on cultural and moral issues (Kapur, 2014). 
Recent studies disclose that despite openly espousing democracy, many Americans 
are willing to tolerate the violation of democratic values, especially if this is to gain 
advantage for their demographic group (Graham and Svolik, 2018; Carey et al. 2018). 
This means that perfecting the institutional machinery of democratic representation 
(i.e. by eliminating the influence of money), much as this is of value on its own, is 
unlikely to deliver a more democratic society, in the sense of democracy discussed 
above.  
To sum up the argument so far: there is a significant difference between a 
quantitative (capitalist) and qualitative (socialist) understanding of democracy and 
social justice. According to the former, democracy is a matter of equal and inclusive 
citizenship, which is in turn obtainable via redistribution, recognition and 
representation. According to the latter, democracy is a social order that gives priority 
to the needs of the entire society. Since the 1970s, the Left has been committed to the 
                                                     
17 Oren Cass was domestic issues director for Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential campaign and a writer 
for the Conservative National Review.  
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quantitative notion of democracy and is now reactivating it in its fight against the 
ascent of right-wing populism. Of course, the mechanisms of political democracy can 
be effectively deployed to increase equality and inclusion within the existing system 
of (capitalist) social relations thereby achieving democratic citizenship. This is a 
worthy goal. However, the Left cannot rely on these mechanisms to obtain radical 
social reform – this requires a different trajectory of mobilization.  Subsuming the 
fight for socialism into a fight for ‘radical democracy’ (for full equality and inclusion 
within a capitalist social order) is to renounce the aspirations of social justice 
understood as meeting the needs of the entire society. It is our 'democratic prejudice' 
that prompts us to charge democracy as a political regime with the inherently 
impossible task of social transformation towards a democratic society – a society free 
from the dynamics of the pursuit of profit on which livelihoods depend.  
We can go a step further in this direction and note the neoliberal nature of 
adopting democracy as a political ideology. On one hand, democracy as a political 
regime is perfectly compatible with the neoliberal policy goals of pursuing national 
economic competitiveness in the global economy. Enhancing the competitiveness of 
national economies (presented as a ‘common interest’) intensifies the process of 
capital accumulation. For national economies to be competitive, labor markets need to 
remain flexible, and productivity must be kept high while remuneration and 
consumption are suppressed. On the other hand, tasking political democracy to deliver 
social and environmental justice aligns perfectly with the neoliberal ruse of off-
loading on society and individuals a burden impossible for them to carry – such as to 
go against their interest in harming the environment while their livelihoods depend on 
jobs that do the harming. As enlightened democrats, citizens are called upon to 
willingly foot the bill for costly environmental protection which quasi all Left parties 
have adopted as a policy priority, while pension funds remain invested in those 
multinational corporations that are doing the pollution.  This neoliberal nature of the 
over-reliance on democracy is the most bitter irony for social democrats who are 
democrats first and socialists second. Subsuming a socialist agenda under an agenda 
for radical democracy (of maximum equality and inclusion) does not undermine the 




5/ The Emancipation Paradox 
The democratic prejudice is also preventing a trenchant analysis of contemporary 
capitalism and the potentialities for emancipation available within it.  This incapacity 
for a fresh scrutiny of capitalism is in turn rooted in the Left’s penchant to discern 
injustices and seek remedies for them by borrowing the analytical matrix of Social 
Democracy from the heyday of the Welfare State. Within that matrix, social injustice 
was perceived in terms of inequalities and exclusion; political mobilization was aimed 
at economic redistribution, cultural recognition and political representation. In order 
to identify what is deficient in this manner of perceiving social justice politically, I 
propose to use a formula drawn from the following rendition of a Marxian analysis of 
capitalism.18  
Marx saw capitalism as a social order, a system of social relations shaped by 
the overarching dynamics of primitive accumulation and competitive pursuit of profit. 
In turn, this social system is structured by key institutions such as the market as a 
place of commodity exchange, and that of private property of the means of 
production.19  In the course of the functioning of capitalism as a social system, 
experiences of injustice emerge along three trajectories of domination: 
Structural domination concerns the way the main structures of the social 
system (the institutions that structure the social relations) affect participants’ life-
chances. In the case of capitalism, within the original Marxian analysis, the class 
structure pivots on the institution of the private property of productive assets. This is 
what allows the exploitation of labor, as it gives owners the capacity to extract surplus 
value from wage labor. 
Relational domination consists in the subordination of one group of actors to 
another due to power asymmetries – asymmetries resulting from the unequal 
distribution of society’s material or ideational resources (e.g. wealth, knowledge, 
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 For an earlier articulation of these three patterns of injustice see Azmanova 2016 and 2018b. 
19
 Marx’s notion of a social system is decidedly different from the one developed within structural-
functionalism. For Marx, the system is not a unity of functionally differentiate spheres of action but a 
sphere of structured social relations – that is, of institutionalized human practices. In his Legitimation 
Crisis Habermas ‘translates’ the Marxian notion of social system into the format of structural 
functionalism (see Azmanova 2019b). 
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recognition). Typical forms of injustice on the plane of relational domination are 
inequalities and exclusion. These types of injustice are fought through strategies of 
redistribution and inclusion. Returning to workers a bigger share of the value they 
produce (in the form of higher wages or other benefits) would alleviate relational 
injustice as it would reduce exploitation, but it would not terminate exploitation and, 
therefore, would not counter structural domination. 
Systemic domination concerns the subordination of all members of society to 
the operational logic of capitalism – the competitive production of profit (or ‘capital 
accumulation’ in Marxian terms). As this the constitutive dynamic of capitalism, all 
participants in this process are subjected to it, including those who escape structural 
and relational domination (the owners of productive assets and the well-paid labor-
market insiders). Marx introduced this trajectory of domination in his analysis of 
alienation (the multi-faceted estrangement of people from their humanity, their 
‘species-essence’) incurred by the dynamics of profit-production. While Marx was 
explicitly concerned with the alienation of wage labor, there is no reason to confine 
the alienating effects of capital accumulation only to wage labor. The typical forms of 
social injustice incurred by systemic domination are the destruction of the natural 
environment and the damage to mental health and work-life balance. These harms are 
caused by individuals’ participation in the competitive production of profit 
irrespective of one’s particular position within the class divide.   
The achievements of the Left throughout the twentieth century took place 
along the path of fighting structural and relational domination: power asymmetries 
were diminished via redistribution of material resources, while exclusion was ended 
through battles for civil and cultural rights. The nationalization of productive assets 
reduced the spaces of exploitation. This broad agenda of justice secured the 
conditions for democratic citizenship, understood as equal and inclusive membership 
of a community.  It is through these accomplishments that the ‘golden age of 
democracy’ in the late twentieth century was achieved.  
It is, of course, commendable that the Left is now trying to resurrect this 
familiar agenda of progressive politics.  However, this limits the political aspirations 
of the Left unduly to matters of structural and relational domination (matters 
regarding the distribution of life-chances). Outside the radar of critique remain 
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concerns regarding the nature of the life-chances that are being distributed. We need 
to ask: what is the model of life within which equality and inclusion are being sought? 
Surely, neither the agenda of growth and redistribution (which austerity policy wiped 
out), nor policies of inclusion and recognition seriously threaten the dynamics of 
capital accumulation and the damage it is doing to the natural environment, human 
communities, and individuals.   
In confining the political revival of the Left to a renewed battle for equality 
and inclusion, the danger is not just in unduly limiting the agenda of progressive 
politics. There is the risk of inadvertently going against the very goals of building 
democracy as an emancipated society that the Left has explicitly set for itself. I will 
formulate this scenario as the paradox of emancipation. The paradox consists in this: 
struggles against relational and structural domination via efforts at increasing equality 
and inclusion tend to validate and increase the desirability of the model within which 
equality and inclusion are being sought. In this way political activism not only 
overlooks issues of systemic domination, but accepts it for the sake of reducing 
structural and relational domination. For example, as I have discussed elsewhere, 
while the second generation of feminists fought for inclusion in the labor market on 
equal terms with men, they not only failed to question the desirability of labor 
commodification, but added additional valiance to it: thus, their empowerment was a 
surrender to the dynamics of competitive profit production (Azmanova 2016). In 
order to avoid getting entrapped in the paradox of emancipation, the Left should seek 
to formulate its agenda as a struggle above all against systemic domination – that is, 
against social harms produced by the competitive production of profit. However, the 
‘democratic prejudice,’ with its nostalgic longing for the pre-neoliberal times of the 
Welfare State, is an obstacle to this. Let me address this problem in some detail.   
  As I have noted, leftist political and intellectual forces tend to view the socio-
political context of neoliberal capitalism through the lens of relational and structural 
injustice – a matrix shaped by the struggles of the ‘old Left’ (the class struggle 
agenda) and the New Left (civil, political and cultural rights).20  The grievances 
                                                     
20 Of course, the Neǁ Left͛s ageŶda surpassed that of ͚rights͛ – it offered a deeper understanding of 
the underlying structures of injustice (beyond economic class) as well as concerns with environmental 
justice which is an issue of systemic injustice. I here focus on the conceptual framework through 
which the Left tends to read the current populist insurrection.  
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voiced by the populist movements thus tend to be interpreted, respectively, either in 
terms of threat to identity (white male privilege) or as impoverishment and rising 
inequality. To fight populism, the Left typically now prescribes redistribution (raising 
the minimum wage, introducing basic income) as well as investment in public 
services – policy solutions which the far right has also demanded and to which the 
center-right in many countries also subscribes. However, this imposes a format of 
analysis that leaves important peculiarities of neoliberal capitalism outside of the 
remit of critique and criticism.   This format of analysis obscures the differentia 
specifica of neoliberal capitalism. This prevents the Left from building a platform for 
its renewal that befits the current historical circumstances. What are the distinctive 
features of contemporary capitalism?   
Neoliberal capitalism began to take shape in the 1980s. At that time, national 
competitiveness in global markets became a policy priority, replacing the ‘jobs, 
growth  and redistribution’ agenda of post-WWII ‘managed’ or ‘organized’ 
capitalism. In the neoliberal formula, competitiveness was to be achieved via a 
combination of domestically liberalized and deregulated product- and labor-markets 
(a return towards laissez-faire) and open economies. This particular policy package 
did not simply trigger the impoverishment of low-skilled workers and increase wealth 
inequalities – two phenomena on which now both the Left and the Right are focusing 
their mobilization. Neoliberal policies have triggered two additional developments. 
 First, the fault-lines of social conflict have been drawn across the former 
capital-labor divide. Capital and labor in companies well-positioned to profit from the 
new economy of open borders and information technologies (aka globalization) have 
come to form a cross-class alliance supporting neoliberalism. On the other side of the 
divide are workers, owners, and managers of companies for whom globalization is a 
source of threat to livelihoods. This means that politically relevant social experiences 
regarding the distribution of life-chances cut across the traditional class divide. 
Therefore, a revival of class politics would be politically futile. Moreover, a return to 
the policy formula of growth and redistribution of the ‘golden age’ of the Welfare 
State (as now urged by both the center-left and center-right) would not do much to 
dampen the global competition for profit through which the environment and human 
lives are being devastated. 
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The second peculiarity of neoliberal capitalism is that experiences of injustice 
are proliferating along the third trajectory of domination (systemic domination) – the 
one shaped by the competitive production of profit. Increased competition in the 
context of a globally integrated economy and a thinning social safety net has 
intensified pressures on all, but especially on people in occupations exposed to global 
competition. What is ailing the working, middle, and upper-middle classes in Western 
democracies is not only (or even mostly) inequality, but the increasing precariousness, 
which is also affecting highly skilled and well-paid workers, as well as the owners 
and managers of companies exposed to global competition. Economic insecurity is an 
acute and spreading affliction that cuts across the class divide. It has become the core 
of the social question of our times.  
Reformulating an agenda of social justice centered on fighting economic 
insecurity (and the unequal distribution of economic security) could help the Left gain 
back the support of voters it has lost to the far right. Such a focus on fighting 
economic insecurity would also help get some of the typical supporters of the center-
Right onboard – educated professionals whose livelihoods are threatened by global 
competition and whose welfare is put at risk by work pressures detrimental to the 
lifestyles they value. This would enable the Left to mount a broad counter-hegemony 
to neoliberal capitalism.21  
 
Conclusion: Democracy is not enough 
What is the Left needed for nowadays? – to return to Jurgen Habermas’ impertinent 
question. The far right is demanding not only cultural, but also social and economic 
protection. The centre-right is raising the minimum wage, launching a Pillar of Social 
Rights (in the European Union), is investing in job retraining, and pledging to fight 
inequality. Unless the Left finds a vision alternative to the old ‘jobs, growth and 
distribution’ agenda, it will not be among the intellectual forces shaping the future. I 
have suggested that the vocation of the Left in the current historical conjuncture is to 
forge a counter-hegemony against neoliberal capitalism, but that the essence of this 
                                                     
21 For an elaboration of this proposal see Azmanova 2019a. 
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counter-hegemony should be neither democracy -- not even ‘radical democracy’, as 
Chantal Mouffe has recently suggested-- nor a renewal of the class struggle, but a new 
socio-economic order.22 
Why isn’t democracy enough and what is wrong with the class struggle? 
Because capitalism has no specific body of dogma, no theology (as Walter Benjamin 
has noted)23, it can fully appropriate democracy as its creed. Once capitalism as a 
social system -- a system of social relations -- has espoused democracy as a political 
system, it places it at its service. To the extent that the great majority’s livelihoods are 
dependent on participation in the process of capital accumulation, we cannot but 
expect democratic procedures to serve that process. Within this framework of 
thinking, the Left will keep facing the dilemma of either serving the short-term 
interests of its electorate in perpetuating the dynamics of capital accumulation, or 
serving the longer-term societal interest in protecting human beings and the natural 
environment from those very dynamics. The recent outbursts of popular demands in 
western democracies for undoing environmental legislation is an illustration of that 
uncomfortable choice.24 The silence of Left parties when confronted with the choice 
between saving jobs and saving the environment is telling of the exact limits of 
political democracy’s power against capitalism.  Within the framework of capitalist 
democracies, social reform can go only as far as it does not imperil those dynamics of 
capital accumulation on which the fortunes of the ‘little man’ depend. 
In Rosa Luxemburg’s famous formulation, “there are only two alternatives for 
mankind: socialism or the development of capitalism to barbarism - there is no third 
possibility” (Luxemburg, 2004 [1919]: 364). Despite, or rather because of the global 
affluence neoliberal capitalism has generated, the harms it has inflicted on 
individuals, communities and the natural environment amount to modern-day 
barbarism. The injustices of neoliberalism neither can, nor should be cast in terms of 
harms to democracy – as democratic deficits. These are harms generated by the very 
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 “[A]dopting a populist strategy, but this time with a progressive objective, intervening on a 
multiplicity of fronts,” Chantal Mouffe urges the Left “to build a new hegemony aiming at recovering 
and deepening democracy” (Mouffe 2018, l.439).  
23
 Benjamin, 1996 [1921]. 
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constitutive logic of capitalism – the competitive production of profit. The spectrum 
of these harms is vast – from impoverishment and damages to physical and mental 
health to fragile work-life balance and incapacity to plan for the future.  
 I have noted that a revival of the old agenda of class struggle, as it is 
becoming fashionable nowadays to urge, will be futile because there has emerged a 
solid cross-class alliance in support of globalization. We have come to a point in 
history when we do not need the class struggle to struggle against the core dynamic of 
capitalism – the competitive production of profit. Another cross-class alliance of 
neoliberal capitalism’s victims has emerged and is growing. Irrespective of their 
vastly different income and education levels, a great multitude of people are suffering 
the harms of the ever-intensifying competitive production of profit – the core logic of 
capitalism.   To mobilize this discontent, the Left needs to replace the old growth-and-
redistribution agenda focused on welfare with one focused on well-being. It should 
bid farewell to the mantra of freedom through work and consumption, which the 
Right is now also espousing, and develop a policy paradigm centered on freedom 
from work and consumption.25The recent mobilizations in Europe and America for a 
Green New Deal carry this promise in a powerful way.  
Right now, democracy is too little to ask.   
  
                                                     
25 I cannot expound here the details of such a policy framework; for my proposal of combining 
universal basic income with universal basic employment into what I call ‘a political economy of trust’ 





I am particularly grateful to Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Chantal Mouffe for challenging 
me on many of the points advanced here.  
 
REFERENCES: 
Azmanova, Albena. 2019a. Capitalism on Edge: radical change without Crisis, 
Revolution, or Utopia. New York: Columbia University Press (forthcoming). 
_________2019b. “Marx’, in Amy Allen and Eduardo Mendieta (eds.) The Cambridge 
Habermas Lexicon. Cambridge University Press.  
_________2018a “The Populist Catharsis: On the Revival of the Political,” in 
Philosophy and Social Criticism 44/ 4 (May 2018): 399–411 
_________2018b. “Relational, structural and systemic forms of power: the ‘right to 
justification’ confronting three types of domination,” Journal of Political 
Power 11:1 (February 2018): 68-78 
_________2016. “Empowerment as Surrender: how women lost the battle for 
emancipation as they won equality and inclusion,” in Social Research 83/3 
(Fall 2016): 749-776, special issue on failure, ed. by Arjun Appadurai. 
________2014. “The ‘Crisis of Capitalism’ and the State – More Powerful, Less 
Responsible, Invariably Legitimate”, in Semantics of Statebuilding: Language, 
Meanings and Sovereignty, ed. by Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, Nicholas Onuf, 
Vojin Rakić, Petar Bojanić (Routledge,  2014), pp. 150-162. 
--------------2013. ͞The Crisis of Europe:  Deŵocratic Deficit aŶd ErodiŶg “oǀereigŶty – Not 
Guilty,͟ Law and Critique 24/1: 23-38.  
________2012. “Social Justice and Varieties of Capitalism: An Immanent Critique”,  
New Political Economy 17/ 4: 445-463.   
________ 2011. “Against the Politics of Fear: On Deliberation, Inclusion, and the 
Political Economy of Trust”, Philosophy and Social Criticism 37/2: 401-412. 
________2004. ‘The Mobilisation of the European Left in the Early 21st Century’, 
European Journal of Sociology 45/ 2: 273-306. 
Balibar, Etienne. 2014. Equaliberty: Political Essays. Transl by James Ingram. 
Durham: Duke University Press.  
Benjamin, Walter. 1974[1931]. “Left-Wing Melancholy,” Screen 15/ 2, 1: 28–32 
(Originally in Die Gesellschaft, 1931).  
______ 1996 [1921]. “Capitalism as Religion”, Selected Writings, Vol.1. Translated 
by Rodney Livingstone. Belknap Harvard Press; pp.288-291.  
Brown, Wendy. 2014. "Is Marx (Capital) Secular?," Qui Parle: Critical Humanities 
and Social Sciences 23/1:109-124. 
______1999. “Resisting Left Melancholy”, Boundary 26/3, pp. 19-27. 
Carey, John M., Katherine P. Clayton, Gretchen Helmke, Brendan Nyhan, Mitchell 
Sanders, and Susan C. Stokes, 2018. “Party, policy, democracy and candidate 
28 
 
choice in U.S. elections”, Bright Line Watch. Working paper, available at: 
http://brightlinewatch.org/us-elections/ 
Cass, Oren. 2018. The Once and Future Worker: A Vision for the Renewal of Work in 
America, Encounter Books, 2018.  
Chalmers, Damian, Markus Jachtenfuchs and Christian Joerges (eds) 2016. The End 
of the Eurocrats' Dream: Adjusting to European Diversity. Cambridge 
University Press.  
Gordon, Peter. 2017. “Mourning in America,” Boston Review, July 18. Gilens, Martin 
and Benjamin I. Page. 2014. “Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest 
Groups and the Average Citizens.” Perspectives on Politics 12/3: 564-581. 
Graham, Matthew, and Milan W. Svolik. 2018. “Democracy in America? 
Partisanship, Polarization, and the Robustness of Support for Democracy in 
the United States.” Working paper, available at: https://cpb-us-
w2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/6/1038/files/2012/12/USA_web-
1dnax02.pdf. 
Hobsbawm, Eric 2000 [1975]. The Age of Capital: 1848-1875. London: 
Abacus/Little, Brown, and Co. 
Fandos, Nicholas. 2018. “House democrat’s Agenda: Ethics, Infrastructure and 
Medical Legislation”, The New York Times, Nov.7, 2018: 
https://nyti.ms/2yUR0EM 
Foucault, Michel. 2010 [1978-1979]. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège 
de France, 1978—1979. Ed. by Michel Senellar, transl. by Graham Burchell. 
New York: Picador/Palgrave.  
Fraser, Nancy 2017 “The End of Progressive Neoliberalism”, Dissent Magazine, 
January 2. 
Habermas, Jürgen. 2018 “’New’ Perspectives For Europe”, Social Europe, 
22/10/2018 
https://www.socialeurope.eu/new-perspectives-for-europe 
___________1975 [1973]. Legitimation Crisis. Transl. by Thomas McCarthy. Beacon 
Press.  
Honneth, Axel. 2016.The Idea of Socialism: Towards a Renewal. Polity Press. 
Lagarde, Christine. 2017. “Building a More Resilient and Inclusive Global Economy’, 
Speech at the Davos Forum April 12; accessible at: 
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/04/07/building-a-more-resilient-
and-inclusive-global-economy-a-speech-by-christine-lagarde 
Kant, Immanuel. 1903 [1795]. Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch. Trans. Mary 
Campbell Smith. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. 
Kapur, Sahil. 2014. “Scholar Behind ‘Viral’ Oligarchy Study Tells You What It 
Means” (interview with Martin Gilens), Talking Points Memo, 22 April, 
accessed 1 Dec. 2018: https://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/princeton-scholar-
demise-of-democracy-america-tpm-interview   
29 
 
Luxemburg, Rosa 1972 [1918]. “The National Assembly”. In Rosa Luxemburg: 
Selected Political Writings, transl. by W.D. Graf., edited by Robert Looker, 
Random House, pp.262-5. 
______ 2004 [1919]. Speech at the founding convention of the German Communist 
Party (December 31, 1919), in Peter Hudis & Kevin B. Anderson (eds.) Rosa 
Luxemburg Reader, New York: Monthly Review Press.   
______1918. “The Russian Revolution – Chapter 8: Democracy and Dictatorship.” 
Marxists Internet Archive. 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1918/russian-
revolution/ch08.htm (accessed 15 December 2018) 
Marcuse, Herbert. 1964. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced 
Industrial Society. New York: Beacon Press.  
Mouffe, Chantal. 2018. For a Left Populism. New York: Verso.  
Neuman, William. 2018. “Why New York City Hired Someone to Improve 
Democracy”, The New York Times, Oct. 2.  
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1887. On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufman 
(New York: Vintage, 1967).  
Plato. 1968 [380 BC]. The Republic, Allan Bloom (transl). New York: Basic 
Books/Harper Collins, Second Edn.  
Polanyi, Karl. 2016[1922] “Socialist accounting” with preface “socialism and the 
embedded economy”, transl. by Johanna Bockman, Ariane Fischer and David 
Woodruff, Theory and Society 45/5: 385-427. 
Rosanvallon, Pierre. 2009. “Democratic Universalism as a Historical Problem”.  
Constellations 16/4: 539-549.  
Tigar, Michael E. 2018.  Mythologies of State and Monopoly Power From Gotha to 
Now. Monthly Review Press. 
Thompson, E.P. 1975. Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act. New York: 
Pantheon Books,  
Traverso, Enzo. 2017. Left-Wing Melancholia: Marxism, History, and Memory. New 
York, Columbia University Press. 
Wilde, Oscar. 1912 [1891]. The Soul of Man under Socialism, London: Arthur L. 
Humphreys.  
Wodak, Ruth. 2015.  The Politics of Fear, London: Sage. 
 
 
 
 
 
